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Abstract 
Some economists believe that social norms are created to improve welfare where the market 
fails. I show that tipping is such a norm, using a model in which a waiter chooses service 
quality and then a customer chooses the tip. The customer’s utility depends on the social 
norm about tipping and feelings such as embarrassment and fairness. The equilibrium 
depends on the exact social norm: higher sensitivity of tips to service quality (according to 
the norm) yields higher service quality and social welfare. Surprisingly, high tips for low 
quality may also increase service quality and social welfare.   
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1. Introduction 
Some economists believe that social norms are created because they increase welfare. Arrow 
(1971, p. 22), for example, wrote, “I want, however, to conclude by calling attention to a less 
visible form of social action: norms of social behavior, including ethical and moral codes. I 
suggest as one possible interpretation that they are reactions of society to compensate for 
market failures.” Two paragraphs below Arrow adds, “There is a whole set of customs and 
norms which might be similarly interpreted as agreements to improve the efficiency of the 
economic system (in the broad sense of satisfaction of individual values) by providing 
commodities to which the price system is inapplicable.”  
  Others, however, oppose this view, and argue that social norms exist for various reasons, 
but not because they improve efficiency or welfare (see for example Elster 1989). My goal is 
to contribute to the debate by analyzing the social norm of tipping. Tipping is a social norm 
because one of the main reasons (sometimes even the only reason) that we tip in certain 
situations is that others also tip in these situations, so that tipping became the norm. Why do 
we conform to social norms? Psychologists suggest that we conform to social norms “so that 
we will be liked and accepted by other people” (Aronson, Wilson and Akert 1999, p. 294). In 
the case of tipping, people often also feel guilty, unfair and embarrassed if they do not tip 
when the norm is to tip.  
  This article addresses several main questions about tipping: can tipping improve welfare, 
and if yes, by how much?
2 Can tipping yield the welfare-maximizing service quality? Do the 
answers to these questions depend on the exact norm about tipping, and if so, in what ways? 
Does tipping motivate workers to provide better service? If yes, does it imply that welfare is 
increased too, or that service quality exceeds its optimal level?  
                                                 
2 I use the shorter “welfare” to denote what Arrow called “the efficiency of the economic system.” 2   
  Tipping is an especially interesting norm to analyze from an economic perspective 
because it is more closely related to economics than most other social norms. Tipping is an 
economic transaction, in which one agent provides service and the other agent pays for it, and 
is related to several different areas in economics. First, it is a major part of income for 
millions of workers in the United States alone; for many of them (waiters, for example) it is 
the main source of income (see Wessels 1997). Thus, tipping is closely related to labor 
economics. Second, people tip in order to feel fair and avoid embarrassment and guilt; this 
suggests a close connection to behavioral economics. Third, tipping is a way of monitoring 
workers by the customers and is a form of providing incentives; it is therefore closely related 
to economics of information. Finally, the owner of the establishment can choose between 
tipping and a service charge and can decide how much direct supervision is required in 
addition to customer supervision (in the form of tipping), suggesting implications of tipping 
to management strategy and industrial organization.
3   
  Another reason why tipping is a particularly interesting social norm is its magnitude. 
Tips in US restaurants alone are about $27 billion each year
 (Azar 2004a), and tipping is 
common in other industries and additional countries, so annual worldwide tips are probably a 
much bigger figure. In addition, as was mentioned above, millions of workers in different 
occupations derive a significant portion of their income, often most of it, from tips.
4  
  Finally, tips can be easily observed and measured, whereas many other social norms are 
not. We can say that someone tipped 13 percent of the bill, or six dollars, and that the norm is 
15 percent; we cannot discuss norms of good table manners in the same way. As a result, the 
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predictions of a theoretical model can be relatively easily tested in the case of tipping, but not 
in many other social norms.  
  Tipping being a social norm still does not necessarily mean that people tip only because 
this is the norm. People follow some norms because it is in their best interest to do so, 
regardless of the social norm. For instance, most people would not choose to go out naked in 
the winter even if this was not against the norm (and the law). Future service considerations 
are sometimes mentioned as a reason for tipping that is not directly related to tipping being a 
social norm. The argument is that by tipping more for good service, the waiter is encouraged 
to give the tipper good service in the future. But why do travelers tip, knowing they are never 
going to come back to the same place? A more plausible explanation is that people tip 
because this is the social norm; if they deviate from it they feel unfair and embarrassed, 
resulting in a disutility that exceeds the utility from the money they can save by not tipping.  
  Thus, tipping illustrates the importance of social norms and utility from feelings in 
economic models: any attempt to model tipping without considering social norms or feelings 
is bound to conclude that one-time customers should not tip (see Ben-Zion and Karni 1977), 
in contradiction to the actual behavior of customers. The importance of social norms and 
feelings, however, is not limited to tipping; they play a role in many areas in economics, such 
as consumer behavior and labor economics, and including them explicitly in models in these 
areas can improve the predictive power of the models. 
The empirical research about tipping is abundant, and a complete discussion of it would 
require too much space and is of little relevance to this article.
5 Some of this literature is 
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mentioned later, where it does relate to the current article. Experimental research includes 
Ruffle (1998), who reports the results of experiments in which participants in dictator and 
ultimatum games acted in a way that resembles tipping, and historical research includes Azar 
(2004d) who looks at the evolution of tipping since its inception a few hundreds years ago 
and tries to learn from it why people tip and whether tipping improves service quality. 
Very little theoretical work in economics was devoted to tipping, however. Sisk and 
Gallick (1985) discuss tipping and offer some interesting ideas about how to interpret the 
tipping transaction. They argue that tips protect the buyer from an unscrupulous seller (or his 
agent) when the brand-name mechanism for assuring contractual performance is insufficient. 
They do not provide a formal model of tipping, however. Schwartz (1997) shows that tipping 
may increase the firm’s profits when consumer segments differ in their demand functions and 
their propensity to tip. Ruffle (1999) presents a theoretical model about gift giving and 
discusses briefly how the model can be applied to tipping as well. Azar (2004a) examines the 
optimal choice of monitoring intensity when workers face incentives that are not provided by 
the firm, such as tips. Increase in such incentives reduces optimal monitoring intensity but 
nevertheless increases effort and profits unambiguously. Azar (2004b) presents a model of 
the evolution of social norms. When a norm is costly to follow and people do not derive 
benefits from following it except for avoiding social disapproval, the norm erodes over time. 
Tip percentages, however, increased over the years, suggesting that people derive benefits 
from tipping, such as impressing others and improving their self-image as being generous and 
kind.  
The main attempt at understanding why people tip using a theoretical model, however, 
remains the pioneering work of Ben-Zion and Karni (1977), who built a theoretical 
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framework for a repeated interaction between a customer and a service agent. They showed 
that the marginal reward for effort must be positive for the service agent to provide more than 
the minimal effort level. They also proved that tips tend to be smaller when turnover of 
customers or service staff is higher and when customers visit the establishment less 
frequently, and concluded that tips are consistent with self-interest seeking behavior only for 
the case of repeated customers.  
The current article adds to Ben-Zion and Karni by introducing social norms and feelings 
as a source of utility (or disutility). This significant change enables to explain why one-time 
customers also tip (and as discussed later, the model probably explains tipping by repeated 
customers as well). The article presents for the first time a complete and formal model of 
tipping that incorporates social norms and utility from feelings to explain why people tip 
(even in one-shot cases), and how workers respond to tipping, taking into account that the 
norm may dictate tips that are a function of service quality. Moreover, the article addresses 
for the first time the question how different tipping norms affect welfare differently.  
The results support Arrow’s view that social norms can improve social welfare. How 
much welfare is improved, however, depends to a large extent on the sensitivity of the social 
norm to service quality. If the norm dictates that bad service should be punished significantly 
(e.g. by not tipping at all for bad service), welfare will be higher than if the norm punishes 
bad service only mildly (or not at all). It follows that if we want to improve welfare, we 
should not tip when we get bad service. On the other hand, when we get extraordinary 
service, we should tip even more than 15 percent (where 15 percent is the norm for good 
service).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model 
and describes the equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes how tipping affects social welfare, and 
Section 4 concludes. 6   
2. The  Model 
The model consists of a single interaction between a waiter and a customer. The waiter plays 
first by choosing the quality of the service he provides, s. The quality is determined by how 
attentive and friendly the waiter is and how much effort he makes to fulfill the customer’s 
needs. Above a certain quality level, providing better service requires the waiter to exert more 
effort. I normalize the quality level that minimizes the waiter’s effort to be zero. We can 
restrict attention to non-negative quality levels, because the equilibrium never involves 
negative service quality. 
The customer plays second by choosing the tip in percentage of the bill. The tip is 
denoted by t ( a  t i p  o f  1 5  p e r c e n t  m e a n s  t = 0.15, not t = 15), is non-negative, and is 
potentially chosen according to the quality of the service provided. The function that 
associates each quality level with a certain tip percentage is referred to as the tipping 
function; it is derived from the customer’s utility maximization. I assume that the social norm 
and the customer’s utility function are common knowledge, so the waiter can calculate the 
tipping function. The rest of this section describes the game in detail and solves it using 
backward induction.  
2.1. The  Customer 
Psychologists offer several reasons why people tip (see for example Lynn and Grassman 
1990). The most common reasons are embarrassment when stiffing (tipping poorly or not at 
all), caused by social pressure (even when dining alone – then the waiter causes the social 
pressure); fairness – most people feel unfair when they do not tip for good service; 
generosity; empathy for the waiter who works hard and earns a low wage; and future service.
6 
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Both embarrassment and fairness motivations are caused by the social norm: people do not 
feel embarrassed or unfair when they do not tip workers that are not supposed to be tipped, 
such as flight attendants.  
Future service is potentially a reason for tipping only when the customer intends to come 
again to the same restaurant. The model in this paper uses a one-shot game, and as such it 
assumes that future service is not an important reason for tipping. This is clearly the case 
when non-repeated customers tip. However, future service seems not to be a reason for 
tipping by repeated customers as well (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; Lynn and 
Grassman 1990; Azar 2004c).  
The other reasons for tipping can be divided into two groups according to their effect on 
the optimal tip. Embarrassment when stiffing and willingness to feel fair generally encourage 
the customer to tip according to the social norm. Generosity and empathy for the waiter might 
lead the customer to tip more than the norm. Consequently, the social norm plays a major role 
in the customer’s decision about the tip size.  
Denote the tip dictated by the social norm for service quality s by n(s); I sometimes refer 
to it as the appropriate tip, but it is a function of service quality rather than a constant. The 
norm is taken as exogenous in the model. This simplifies the analysis significantly, but 
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implies an additional assumption and raises a question. The assumption implied is that the 
customer does not think that he can change the social norm by changing his tip, a reasonable 
assumption because each customer is a negligible fraction of the population.  
The question raised is what if the analysis shows that the optimal tipping function is 
different from the social norm? Does such result imply a problem in the model? The answer 
is no. First, while actual tipping does change the social norm in the long run, it takes many 
years for the norm to change. Therefore, at any given time, actual tipping may be different 
from the social norm. Second, the model deals with tipping in a specific restaurant (since the 
waiter and the customer can identify the specific restaurant they are in), which need not be a 
representative restaurant. As long as the model does not yield tips that are always lower (or 
always higher) than the social norm, any single restaurant may have tips that differ from the 
norm. The national average of tips should be equal to the norm if the norm is stable, but the 
tips in each restaurant need not. Finally, if we interpret the social norm as describing not only 
how much to tip, but also how people should feel when they disobey the norm, then the 
model in fact offers a characterization of a stable social norm: the optimal tipping behavior is 
identical to the norm, so one can think about the norm as being endogenous under this 
interpretation (more on this later). 
The norm about tipping is that poor service deserves lower tips (Post 1997). I therefore 
assume that n is non-decreasing, and in addition assume that it is continuous and that n(s) ≥ 0 
for all s (there cannot be a norm to tip a negative percentage). Denote the bill size by b, and 
the deviation of the tip from the norm by d (notice that the deviation can be negative): 
( 1 )             d = t – n(s).                
The customer’s utility depends on wealth, enjoyment from the dining experience, and 
feelings (embarrassment, fairness and so on). I assume that the utility function is separable in 
its three components: the utilities from wealth, dining, and feelings are added together to 9   
compute the total utility, but otherwise they do not interact with each other. Since the cost of 
the meal is a small fraction of the customer’s wealth, I assume that she has constant marginal 
utility from money in this range of wealth levels. As a result, we can ignore her initial wealth 
and consider only the changes in her wealth, –b(1 + t). The utility from feelings, denoted by 
f(d), depends on the social norm: embarrassment, for instance, arises only when the customer 
violates the norm. Moreover, the magnitude of the feelings depends on the size and direction 
of the deviation from the norm. The utility from the dining experience depends on service 
quality and on the quantity and quality of food purchased, which can be measured by the bill 
size, and is denoted by G(s, b); G is strictly increasing in both s and b. Substituting d = t – 
n(s), the utility function takes the following form: 
( 2 )         u(s, t, b) = –b(1 + t) + f(t – n(s)) + G(s, b).            
Recall that s is chosen by the waiter. The bill size is chosen by the customer, but is not 
the focus of this paper, and is taken as exogenous in what follows in order to simplify the 
analysis. Another justification for taking b as exogenous is that b is determined primarily 
when the customer makes the order. When she observes the service quality and has to choose 
the tip, the bill size is already given.  
The utility from feelings, although only a function of d, consists of two different parts. 
The desire to conform to social norms in order to feel fair and to avoid embarrassment leads 
the customer to tip according to the social norm. Tipping much above the norm is considered 
inappropriate, and in addition may cause the customer to feel wasteful, so if fairness and 
embarrassment were the only motives for tipping, f would be maximized around d = 0. If 
empathy for the waiter and generosity were the only motivations for tipping, f would be 
increasing in d up to the point where the customer does not feel empathy or a desire to be 
generous anymore. In general, the marginal utility from feelings, f‘, is decreasing in the tip 10   
size; since d = t – n(s), it is also decreasing in d. Assumption 1 summarizes the assumptions 
made so far and adds some regularity conditions:  
Assumption 1.  (i) f is twice continuously differentiable and is strictly concave in d.  
       (ii) f’(d) → ∞ as d → −∞, and lim d→∞ f’(d) < 0. 
        (iii) n is non-decreasing and continuous and n(s) ≥ 0 for all s. 
        (iv) G is strictly increasing in s and in b. 
    In addition, let us define the following function:  
Definition 1.  t^(s) is the function that satisfies f’(t^(s) – n(s)) = b for all s.   
As we will see in Proposition 1, t^(s) is the utility-maximizing tip as a function of s, except 
when t^(s) is negative. When the tip is t^(s), the psychological marginal utility from tipping, 
given by f’(t^(s) – n(s)), is exactly equal to the marginal cost of tipping, which is b, which 
provides the intuition why t^(s) is optimal (when the constraint that the tip cannot be negative 
does not bind). 
The continuity of f’, Assumption 1 (ii), and b > 0, imply that t^(s) exists for all s (notice that 
t^(s) might be negative). Strict concavity of f implies that for every s there is a unique value 
t^(s). It is possible, however, that t^(s1) = t^(s2) for s1≠s2. Assumption 1 leads to the following 
results (all the proofs appear in the appendix): 
Proposition 1.  The optimal tipping function is t*(s) = max [t^(s), 0]. 
Proposition 1 follows, as can be seen in more detail in the proof, from the first-order 
condition for utility maximization by the customer, together with the constraint that the tip 
cannot be negative.  
Corollary 1.  For a given value of s, if b > f’(–n(s)), then t*(s) = 0.  
Corollary 1 reflects the following idea: if even when the tip is zero, the marginal cost of 
tipping is still higher than the marginal benefit, we would like to tip a negative amount, but 
since we cannot, the best we can do is to tip zero.  11   
Lemma 1.  t^ is parallel to n; that is, t^(s) – n(s) is a constant for all s. 
Lemma 1 essentially says that if we could tip a negative percentage, the difference between 
the optimal tip and the tip dictated by the norm would not depend on s but rather it would be 
a constant.   
Corollary 2.  t^ is non-decreasing and continuous.    
Corollary 2 implies that better service can either increase tips or leave them unchanged, but it 
cannot reduce tips.  
As can be seen from Proposition 1, the optimal tipping function may be kinked. The kink 
point is important for our purposes, so let us define the following: 
Definition 2.  Let s0 be the highest value of s that satisfies t^(s) = 0, if such value exists.  
Suppose that s0 exists. Since t^ is non-decreasing, it follows that for any s > s0, we obtain 
t*(s) = t^(s) > 0. That is, s0 is the kink in the optimal tipping function, t*. Since t^ is parallel 
to n, t* is parallel to n for all s ≥ s0. Because n is non-decreasing and t*(s) = 0 for all s ≤ s0, t* 
is non-decreasing. Since t^ is continuous and t*(s) = max [t^(s), 0], t* is continuous. 
 Since  t^ is continuous, s0 exists whenever we can find values s1 and s2 such that t^(s1) ≤ 0 
and t^(s2) ≥ 0. That is, s0 does not exist when t^ is always strictly positive, or always strictly 
negative. When t^(s) < 0 for all s, it means that the customer never tips regardless of service 
quality. I assume that this does not happen; indeed, a very small fraction of the population 
averse tipping so strongly that they never tip.  
 When  t^(s) > 0 for all s, the customer gives a strictly positive tip regardless of service 
quality; there is no kink in the optimal tipping function, t*(s) = t^(s) for all s, and therefore t* 
is non-decreasing and is parallel to n. For the purpose of the next subsection, define s0 to be 
some negative number in this case; this does not change the analysis because s  ≥ 0  in 
equilibrium. Notice that t^(s) > 0 for all s whenever t^ is strictly above n, because n(s) ≥ 0 for 
all s.  12   
  The analysis above shows that the optimal tipping function follows the social norm very 
closely. In fact, the two are parallel except for points where the customer leaves a zero tip. 
Whether the optimal tip is above or below the social norm depends on the exact shape of f. 
This result suggests the following interpretation: suppose that the optimal tipping function 
describes the tipping of the representative customer at a specific restaurant (a similar 
argument can be made if the tipping function belongs to a single customer at a specific 
restaurant). If in some restaurants the tips are higher than the norm while in others they are 
below the norm, then the social norm might be the average of the tipping behavior in 
different restaurants, and yet the representative customer of each restaurant tips differently 
from the norm. This is one explanation for why getting a tipping function that is different 
from the norm does not mean that the norm should change, even in the long run. 
  When tips are strictly positive, the slope of the social norm is equal to the slope of the 
tipping function, which in turn determines the incentives faced by the waiters. When the 
social norm is steep (differences in service quality affect the tip significantly), waiters face 
large incentives to provide excellent service; when it is flat, they do not. Therefore, a steep 
social norm may yield a high-quality equilibrium, whereas a flat norm may result in a low-
quality equilibrium. Low service quality, in turn, reduces the utility from the dining 
experience and the willingness to pay for it, and therefore may affect social welfare. The next 
sections discuss these intuitions more rigorously.    
2.2. The  Waiter 
The waiter’s utility is a function of his wealth and his effort on the job; his effort depends on 
the quality and quantity of the service he provides. The quantity of the service can be 
approximated by the bill size. While the bill depends on the price of each item, the variation 
within the same restaurant in the prices of different entrees is not large. The number of diners 
at the table and whether they order drinks, appetizers, and desserts, cause most of the 13   
variation in bill size at a specific restaurant. More diners or more items ordered increase both 
the bill and the quantity of service, and therefore the two are closely related.  
Serving multiple diners exhibits increasing returns to scale: serving four diners at one 
table requires less than four times the effort of serving a single diner. The bill, however, is 
roughly proportional to the number of diners, so this observation suggests that quantity of 
service is concave in bill size. On the other hand, when bill size is increased because of 
additional items such as drinks, appetizers and desserts, the quantity of service is convex in 
bill size. The reason is that taking an order for a dessert and bringing it requires similar effort 
to that needed for an entrée order, but adds much less to the bill size. For simplicity, I assume 
that these opposite effects cancel out on average. As a result, the effort is proportional to the 
bill size and is equal to e(s)b.  
The function e(s) represents the effort required per dollar of bill size, when service 
quality is s. I assume that e is twice continuously differentiable. Recall that by previous 
normalization,  e(s) is minimized when s = 0; this implies that e’(0) = 0. Effort should 
increase in bill size for all s, therefore e(s) > 0 for all s. In addition, I assume that e is strictly 
convex: the higher is service quality, the more effort is required to improve it further. It 
follows from the strict convexity of e and from e’(0) = 0 that e’(s) > 0 for any positive s: 
better service requires more effort (above the threshold s = 0). The following assumption 
summarizes the characteristics of the effort function (most of them discussed above): 
Assumption 2. The effort function is e(s)b; e is strictly convex and twice continuously 
differentiable; e’(0) = 0; e(s) > 0 for all s; and e’(s) → ∞ as s → ∞. 
  I assume that the waiter’s utility is separable in wealth and effort, and that each tip is a 
small fraction of the waiter’s wealth; as a result, his marginal utility from the tip is constant. 
Therefore, we can ignore his initial wealth and consider only the change in his wealth, which 
is equal to t(s)b. Consequently, the waiter’s utility function takes the following form: 14   
( 3 )           v(s, t, b) = b(t(s) – e(s)).              
  The waiter chooses s to maximize his utility; b is exogenous and t(s) is the tip chosen by 
the customer as was derived in the previous subsection.
7 Including t(s) rather than t in the 
utility function corresponds to the assumption that the waiter knows the social norm and the 
utility function of the customer and therefore is able to calculate t(s) and predict the tip that 
results from each service quality. This assumption has two alternative interpretations: one is 
that the customer in the previous subsection is the representative customer of the restaurant. 
A specific customer may tip differently, but the waiter does not know the tipping function of 
each customer and therefore he bases his optimization on the representative customer. The 
second interpretation is that the customer is a specific customer and the waiter is able to 
predict her tipping function according to her appearance and the dining occasion (lunch or 
dinner, business-oriented or social event).  
 2.3.  Choice of Service Quality in Equilibrium 
It is possible to show that under some conditions, the waiter either chooses zero effort or 
chooses the service quality s* that satisfies the first-order condition t’(s*) – e’(s*) = 0. This 
analysis, however, does not provide insights about the characteristics of the effort function 
and the social norm that affect the equilibrium service quality. Instead, I assume in what 
follows that the social norm, the utility from feelings and the effort function take specific 
functional forms; then, comparative statics on the parameters of the functions can yield some 
interesting insights. I assume that the social norm takes the following form:  
( 4 )         n(s) = N0 + N1s,  where N0 ≥ 0 and N1 ≥ 0.            
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  A norm of tipping a fixed percentage of the bill regardless of service quality, for 
example, corresponds to N1 = 0. The linearity of the norm is not as restrictive as it might 
appear, since quality has no natural scale. Therefore, we can scale quality to yield the linear 
relationship assumed: take an arbitrary service quality above zero and denote it as s = 1; 
quality s = 2 is then defined as the quality that increases the tip compared to s = 1 by n(1) – 
n(0) = N1, and so on. 
I assume that f is given by 
( 5 )           f(d) = F0 + F1d + F2d
2,              
 where  F2 < 0. Notice that the customer never chooses d > –F1/2F2. Doing so reduces her 
utility from feelings and her wealth compared to d = –F1/2F2. Therefore, the behavior of f(d) 
for d > –F1/2F2 does not matter as long as it is below f(–F1/2F2). In other words, we can use 
f(d) without loss of generality for any utility from feelings f^ in the form of  
f^(d) = F0 + F1d + F2d
2     for all d ≤ –F1/2F2 
f^(d) ≤  F0 – F1
2/4F2     for all d > –F1/2F2. 
Therefore, the form of f(d) is less restrictive than it appears to be. In particular, the utility 
from feelings does not have to be symmetric in d for the analysis below to be correct.  
I suggest the following interpretation for f: F2 measures the magnitude of the reasons that 
cause the customer to tip close to the social norm, namely embarrassment and fairness. F1 
measures the effect of the reasons to tip even more than the social norm: generosity and 
empathy for the waiter, minus the opposite effect of the feeling of wastefulness that might 
arise when the customer tips more than is necessary.  
Substituting  d = t – N0 – N1s, the first-order condition of the customer’s problem 
becomes 
( 6 )           F1 + 2F2(t – N0 – N1s) = b.              16   
Using Proposition 1, the optimal tip is 
( 7 )         t(s) = Max [(b – F1)/2F2 + N0 + N1s, 0].            
The last equation can be rewritten as 
( 8 )           t(s) = Max [T0 + T1s, 0],              
where T0 = (b – F1)/2F2 + N0 and T1 = N1. 
It is easy to see that if F1 = b then the tipping function is identical to the social norm (and 
if F2 is very big compared to b − F1, they are almost identical). We can think about the norm 
that society creates as including not only how much to tip, but also how badly to feel when 
one disobeys the norm.
8 Under this interpretation, we can define the equilibrium (or a stable 
norm) to occur when F1 = b. When this happens, people tip exactly what the norm prescribes, 
and therefore even if in the long run their behavior affects the norm, the norm does not 
change.  
Notice that F1 = b > 0 implies that ignoring the desire to save money, the customer 
prefers tipping above the norm to tipping exactly the amount dictated by the norm. This can 
occur, for example, if the norm is that over-tippers are considered generous, therefore giving 
people a reason to tip above the norm. In equilibrium, however, this incentive to tip above the 
norm is exactly offset by the desire to have more money, and by the negative feeling of 
wastefulness. Moreover, if we think about b as being different in various restaurants rather 
than a constant, F1 = b implies that showing off generosity by over-tipping (minus the effect 
of feeling wasteful) is more utility enhancing in higher-priced restaurants. Indeed, this is 
supported by the evidence that tips in upscale restaurants tend to be higher (not only in 
absolute value, but also in percentage of the bill) than those in cheaper restaurants (Post 
                                                 
8 I thank Ricky Lam for this idea.  17   
1997). For the rest of the paper, however, I consider F1  and  F2 as depending on the 
customer’s personality, rather than being part of the norm. 
Suppose that T1 > 0; restricting attention to s ≥ 0, if T0 ≥ 0 then the tipping function is 
affine. If T0 < 0, it is kinked: it is horizontal and equal to zero up to s0 ≡ −T0/T1, and is affine 
with a slope of T1 for s > s0. Equation (8) shows again what was argued before in the general 
case: whenever the tip is positive, the tipping function is parallel to the social norm. In 
particular, for any s ≥ max [s0, 0], both are affine with a slope of N1. Since F2 < 0, if F1 ≥ b 
then T0 ≥ N 0 ≥ 0 and the tipping function parallels the social norm for all non-negative s. 
Once again, the norm can be either above of below the tipping function: the tipping function 
exceeds the norm if F1 > b, is exactly equal to the norm if F1 = b, and is below the norm if F1 
< b. The intuition is that when evaluated at d = 0, the marginal cost of the tip is b and the 
marginal benefit is F1, so for deviations close to zero the customer prefers d < 0 (to tip below 
the norm) if F1 < b. The strict concavity of f(d) ensures that if for d-values close to zero d < 0 
is preferred to d = 0, then the optimal d when allowing d to take any value is still negative. 
The intuition for the case F1 > b is similar.  
After solving the customer’s problem, we now go backwards and ask which service 
quality the waiter chooses given the customer’s tipping behavior. I assume that the waiter’s 
effort function (per unit of bill size) is quadratic, e(s) = E0 + E1s + E2s
2. Since by previous 
assumptions e’(0) = 0, e(0) > 0 and e is strictly convex, we get E0 > 0, E1 = 0 and E2 > 0. 
The waiter’s utility is therefore (with some abuse of notation, keeping v as the utility 
function) 
( 9 )         v(b, s) = b(max [T0 + T1s, 0] – E0 – E2s
2),            
 where  E0 > 0, E2 > 0, and T1 ≥ 0.  18   
  I assume that the waiter’s utility when he chooses s = 0 and does not receive tip, which is 
equal to –bE0, is greater than his utility from quitting his job and working somewhere else.
9 
The waiter chooses s to maximize his utility and takes b parametrically. Recall that the waiter 
never chooses negative s, as this is strictly dominated by s = 0. Clearly, when T1 = 0, the 
optimal service quality is zero, as the waiter is not rewarded for extra effort. When T1 > 0, it 
is more convenient to examine the first derivatives t’ and e’ rather than t and e. The waiter 
wants to choose s that maximizes t(s) – e(s); doing so is equivalent to choosing s that 
maximizes the area under t’ minus the area under e’, both evaluated between 0 and s. Since t’ 
and e’ are the marginal benefit and marginal cost (per dollar of bill size) for the waiter from 
increasing service quality, the areas under t’ and e’ between 0 and s are the total benefit and 
total cost resulting from quality s. Recall that e’(s) = 2E2s, t’(s) = T1 for all s > s0, and t’(s) = 
0 for all s < s0, where s0 is the kink point in the tipping function. There are two cases to 
consider: 
 (1)  When  T0 ≥ 0, the kink is irrelevant because it occurs at s0 ≤ 0. The slope of t(s) is T1 
> 0 for all positive s; since e’(0) = 0, we obtain t’(s) > e’(s) for values of s close to zero. 
Therefore, the optimal quality is strictly positive. 
 (2)  When  T0 < 0, t’(s) is equal to zero for s < s0 and to T1 for s > s0. We can then divide 
the analysis to two sub-cases: if T1 ≤ e’(s0) = −2E2T0/T1, then t’(s) is below e’(s) for all s ≥ 0, 
implying that the optimal quality is zero. If T1 > e’(s0) = −2E2T0/T1, two points might be 
optimal: s = 0 and s = T1/2E2. We have to compute the waiter’s utility in both of them 
ascertain which one is better. These observations are summarized in the following 
proposition. 
                                                 
9 While this assumption simplifies the analysis, what we really need is only that the waiter receives at least his 
reservation utility when he provides the optimal service quality. This is likely to hold, because if it does not, all 
waiters quit their jobs; restaurants, then, have to increase wages until the waiters receive their reservation utility. 19   
Proposition 2.  (i) If T1 = 0, then the waiter chooses s = 0. 
        (ii) If T1 > 0 and T1
2 < –4T0E2, then the waiter chooses s = 0. 
       (iii) If T1 > 0 and T1
2 ≥ –4T0E2, the waiter chooses s = T1/2E2. 
2.4.  The Importance of the Social Norm  
While the service quality in equilibrium depends on several parameters, the ones that are the 
focus of this paper are those of the social norm, N0 and N1. By examining the effect of N0 and 
N1 on service quality we can not only infer whether the social norm of tipping can improve 
service quality in general, but also see how different norms result in different quality levels. 
Let s* denote the service quality chosen by the waiter. The effect of N1 on s* is summarized 
in the following corollary: 
Corollary 3.  (i) When T0 ≥ 0, s* is strictly increasing in N1.  
(ii) When T0 < 0, there exists a value X such that s* = 0 for N1 < X and 
s* is strictly increasing in N1 for all N1 ≥ X. 
(iii) For any combination of values for the parameters N0, F0, F1, F2, b, 
E0, and E2, we can ensure that s* is above any arbitrary service quality 
s that we want by choosing N1 large enough.  
  Proposition 2 and Corollary 3 suggest the importance of the slope of the social norm with 
respect to service quality. If the slope is zero, service quality is zero. Whenever service 
quality is positive, it is strictly increasing in the slope; and by choosing a high enough slope, 
we can ensure that the service quality exceeds any desired level. When the social norm 
recommends varying the tip significantly according to the service quality (high N1), the 
customer does so and provides incentives for the waiter to improve the service. On the other 
hand, if the norm dictates roughly the same tip regardless of the service received, equilibrium 
service quality is very low, possibly even zero.  
The importance of N0 is suggested by the next corollary: 20   
Corollary 4.  If T1
2/4E2 < (F1 – b)/2F2 (notice that F1 < b is necessary for this to hold) 
then there exists a value Y > 0 such that if N0 < Y then s* = 0.  
The significance of N0 is somewhat surprising. At first, it is not clear why a constant of 
the social norm should matter for the waiter’s choice of quality. Being a constant, it does not 
seem to affect the incentives of the waiter to increase quality in any way; recall that the social 
norm does not have a kink because N0 ≥ 0, so N0 is part of the appropriate tip regardless of 
service quality. The reason why N0 matters is that the tipping function might be below the 
social norm, and might be kinked. When the tipping function is kinked (this happens when T0 
< 0, or equivalently N0 < (F1 – b)/2F2), the waiter has to increase his effort without reward up 
to s0 = –T0/T1; only further increase in his effort increases his tip. The lower is the value of 
N0, the lower T0 is. If F1 < b, then T0 is negative for low values of N0. In this case, lower N0 
implies higher absolute value of T0 and higher s0; the waiter has to make more effort before 
he starts being rewarded for additional effort. Naturally, this increases the likelihood that he 
finds s = 0 to be optimal.  
  In some sense, we can conclude that while both N0 and N1 are important in affecting s*, 
N1 is more important. The reason is that N0 has an effect only when T1
2/4E2 < (F1 – b)/2F2 
(see Corollary 4), while N1 affects s* for any parameter values. Moreover, while both N0 and 
N1 can determine under certain conditions whether s* is positive or zero, marginal changes in 
N1 have an effect on s* also when s* > 0, while marginal changes in N0 do not; to see this, 
recall that whenever s* is positive, it is equal to T1/2E2 = N1/2E2.  
2.5.  The Potential Market Failure 
Proposition 2 suggests that in certain conditions service quality in equilibrium is zero. This 
result represents a market failure in the market for good service. At s = 0, the marginal 
benefit of the customer from better service, which is assumed to be strictly positive, exceeds 
the marginal cost for the waiter of improving service, which is zero. Yet, the market outcome 21   
is the inefficient zero service quality. In the absence of an explicit contract between the waiter 
and the customer, incentives are provided to the waiter by the social norm and the willingness 
of the customer to adhere to it. If the social norm does not provide the right incentives, the 
market for good service collapses.  
What happens when the waiter chooses to provide zero quality in equilibrium? One 
possibility is that suggested by the model: customers get poor service; if N1 > 0, they do not 
leave tips (see Lemma 2 below), and if N1 = 0, they leave tips only if T0 > 0. There is an 
alternative, however: if the consumer surplus from dining in a certain restaurant is generally 
small, then zero quality, even though it saves the customer the expense of tipping, can result 
in negative consumer surplus. In this case, the customer chooses to go to a different 
restaurant or to eat at home.  
The restaurant owner, if she wants to stay in business, has to make sure service 
improves; to do so, she supervises the waiters directly, and provides them with incentives to 
excel in their job. These incentives can be higher wages, better shifts, better tables and 
promotion to the good waiters, and dismissal of the less competent ones. The increased 
service quality can even be above s0, resulting in positive tips that enhance the incentives 
faced by the waiters even further. 
Since the owner spends money on direct supervision anyway, she might find it optimal to 
take the tips from the waiters by adding a fixed-percentage service charge (sometimes called 
gratuity) that replaces tipping.
10 Direct supervision might be needed also when s* is positive, 
but is too small and customers either avoid the restaurant or substantially reduce the price 
they are willing to pay for dining there. Supervision by the owner, however, is costly, 
whereas monitoring by the customer is not. The potential inefficiency of the social norm is 
                                                 
10 Such service charges are common in Europe; in the United States, they are often imposed on parties of six or 
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now represented by the cost of supervision rather than by low-quality equilibrium. In other 
words, the social norm of tipping can save the need of costly supervision of waiters, but 
whether or not it does so depends on the exact norm – in particular on the sensitivity of the 
appropriate tip to service quality (N1 in the model). 
2.6.  Comparative Statics 
While the effect of N0 and N1 on the equilibrium of the model was discussed above, it is 
interesting to know how the other parameters, namely F0, F1, F2, b, E0 and E2, affect the 
equilibrium. Recall that whenever s* > 0, it is equal to T1/2E2 = N1/2E2. That is, the 
equilibrium quality is strictly decreasing in E2. This is intuitive: the more costly it is for the 
waiter to provide excellent service (higher E2), the lower the service quality he chooses in 
equilibrium. No other parameter except N1 affects s* conditional on s* being positive. But 
several parameters affect whether s* is positive or zero. In particular, Proposition 2 suggests 
that if T1 > 0, then s* = 0 whenever T1
2 < −4E2T0; substituting for T1 and T0, the inequality 
becomes N1
2 < −4E2(N0 + (b − F1)/2F2).  
  This inequality can be satisfied only if b > F1 (since F2 < 0). This means that higher b 
and lower F1 make it more likely that s* = 0. The intuition about b is that the higher the bill 
is, the bigger is the incentive to stiff, because more money is at stake. Consequently, s0 
increases, which means that the waiter has to make more effort before he starts to be 
rewarded for additional effort; therefore, he is more likely to find the effort required to get 
positive tip too big and to choose s* = 0. The intuition about F1 is that higher F1 increases the 
willingness of the customer to tip and reduces s0; therefore, the waiter is less likely to find 
zero quality to be optimal.  
 When  b > F1, higher E2 also makes it more likely that the waiter chooses s* = 0. 
Intuitively, the more costly is effort, the more likely the waiter is to find zero quality to be 
optimal. With b > F1, higher F2 (closer to zero) makes it more likely that the waiter chooses 23   
s* = 0. F2 closer to zero means that the social norm is less important to the customer, stiffing 
is more likely, s0 increases and the waiter is more likely to save his effort. F0 and E0 do not 
affect s*; this is intuitive, as they enter as constants in the utility functions of the customer 
and the waiter.  
3. Social  Welfare 
To examine how efficient is tipping in ensuring good service, the natural thing to do is to 
compare the equilibrium service quality to the welfare maximizing quality. The results do not 
depend on the functional forms of f and e that were used to analyze the equilibrium, so I 
allow for flexible forms of f and e, where f is strictly concave and e is strictly convex. I retain 
n(s) = N0 + N1s as the social norm, however, to enable meaningful discussion about the 
parameters of the social norm.  
  I assume that the utility from the dining experience is proportional to the bill size. This 
assumption implies that the utility from dining, G(s, b), can be written as g(s)b. Notice that 
g’(s)b is the marginal utility from an increase in service quality, while N1b is the associated 
increase in tip (according to the social norm). It makes sense that the norm is such that the 
customer and the waiter split (not necessarily equally) the gains from improved service 
quality. If the norm gives the customer a strictly positive share of the gains at any s, then N1 
< g’(s) for all s. Notice that if N1 > g’(s) for some s, it implies that the norm gives the waiter 
rewards for increased quality beyond the additional utility that the customer derives from this 
better quality. The customer, whose optimal tipping function is parallel to the norm whenever 
the tip is strictly positive, is actually made worse off by the increased quality, because of the 
higher tip she is expected to give. In such a case, there is no reason why the norm, and the 
customer, should encourage higher service quality by such a high slope (N1). Therefore, I 
assume that g’(s) ≥ N1 for all s (in Proposition 3 below I make the stronger assumption g’(s) 
> N1). The customer’s utility function is given by: 24   
( 10 )        u(s, t, b) = b(g(s) − 1 − t) + f(t − N0 − N1s).      
     Recall that the general form of the waiter’s utility function is v(s, t, b) = b(t(s) – e(s)). 
The welfare function, w(s, t, b) is defined as the sum of the non-monetary utilities of the 
waiter and the customer:  
( 11 )        w(s, t, b) = f(t − N0 − N1s) + b(g(s) – e(s)).    
     In addition to the assumptions in the previous section, I assume the following: 
Assumption 3.  g – e is strictly concave (notice that concavity of g is sufficient for this to 
hold given strict convexity of e), g is twice continuously differentiable, N1 > 0, and g’(s) 
≥ N1 for all s. 
  Assumption 3 leads to the next two results: 
Lemma 2.  When N1 > 0, there is no equilibrium (of the two-stage game described in the 
previous section) in which service quality is zero and the tip is strictly positive. 
Proposition 3.  Assume that N1 < g’(s) for all s. Then, 
(i) The welfare-maximizing service quality is strictly higher than that obtained in 
equilibrium.  
(ii) The welfare-maximizing tip is weakly higher than that obtained in equilibrium. 
Proposition 3 suggests that although the social norm enables an equilibrium with positive 
service quality, as long as N1 < g’(s) for all s, the equilibrium involves a service quality 
smaller than optimal. This result may have implications for restaurant owners. If they can 
increase service quality, they may be able to raise prices more than they have to compensate 
the waiters for the additional effort. To see this, suppose that they increase service quality by 
one unit compared to the equilibrium. The customer’s utility from dining increases by 
bg’(s*), but he also tips bN1 more, so the owner may be able to raise prices by up to b(g’(s*) 
− N 1). He has to compensate the waiter for the increased effort, net of the increased tips 
received by the waiter: b(e’(s*) − N1). The owner’s profit from increasing the service quality 25   
may therefore be up to the difference, b(g’(s*) − e’(s*)). Is this difference positive? As long 
as s* < s
w, the answer is yes. Since g − e is strictly concave, g’ − e’ is strictly decreasing. By 
definition, g’(s
w) − e’(s
w) = 0, so g’(s*) − e’(s*) > 0 for all s* < s
w.  
Improving service quality, however, entails not only additional compensation to the 
waiter, but also costly monitoring. When the owner relies on tipping to give the waiter 
incentives to provide good service (as is often the case in practice), she does not have to incur 
costly monitoring. When the owner wants to increase service quality beyond the equilibrium 
level, she has to employ workers that supervise the waiter’s work, and maybe even to invest 
in training of the waiter. These additional costs may outweigh the potential benefits from 
increased quality, resulting in no action being taken by the owner to increase service quality.  
So far we have seen that under several assumptions the equilibrium service quality is 
below the optimal level. It is interesting to explore further the connection between the norm 
and the resulting equilibrium: what conditions about the social norm affect how close is the 
equilibrium to social optimum? What is the optimal social norm? How does the social norm 
affect social welfare? The following corollary addresses these questions: 
Corollary 5.  (i) For all N1 < g’(s
w) and s* > 0, |s
w − s*| is strictly decreasing in N1.  
(ii) The optimal affine social norm has N1 = g’(s
w); N0 does not affect 
social welfare, as long as N0 is above some threshold. 
(iii) Social welfare is strictly increasing in N1 for all N1 < g’(s
w). 
Corollary 5 demonstrates the importance of the slope of the social norm, N1. Up to 
g’(s
w), higher slope (N1) yields higher welfare. It is easy to see the intuition behind the 
optimal norm condition, N1 = g’(s
w), if we assume that g is affine: g(s) = G0 + G1s. Then, the 
optimal norm has N1 = g’(s
w) = G1. When the waiter increases service quality by one unit, he 
gets bN1 = bG1 more in tips. That is, he gets all the fruits of the increased quality; the 
customer pays every increase in her utility back to the waiter in the form of tips. The waiter 26   
in this case chooses to increase service quality as long as its effort cost, e’(s)b, is less than the 
utility it brings to the customer, bG1; that is exactly what a social planner would like to do as 
well, and the resulting service quality with such norm is the quality that a social planner 
would like to implement. 
Although tipping is not likely to yield the welfare-maximizing service quality, it has the 
potential to increase welfare compared to the no-tipping equilibrium. Notice, however, that 
when tipping does not exist, the customer has no utility from feelings. Therefore, in addition 
to the effect of tipping on service quality, tipping may affect social welfare directly through 
the utility or disutility that people experience when they tip. If people find tipping extremely 
annoying because it requires them to compute the tip and look for the correct change, tipping 
can be welfare reducing even if it increases service quality significantly. On the other hand, if 
people like tipping because it gives them power and allows them to reward a good waiter and 
punish a bad waiter, tipping may be welfare-enhancing even if it has no effect on service 
quality. Several experimental studies, for example, found that people are often willing to 
incur costs to punish others who were hostile to them or to reward others who were friendly 
(see Fehr and Falk 2002). Without substituting numbers for the parameters of the model, 
however, we do not know whether the utility from feelings is negative or positive. I will 
therefore choose a conservative approach and  compare welfare with and without tipping by 
looking only at welfare from service quality; that is, f does not enter the welfare function, 
implying W(s, b) = b(g(s) – e(s)). 
Proposition 4.  Whenever the equilibrium service quality is strictly positive, the 
existence of tipping increases welfare as defined by W(s, b). 
This result shows that tipping is a social norm that has the potential, under some 
reasonable conditions, to increase welfare by increasing service quality.  27   
4. Conclusion 
The article presents for the first time a complete and formal model that incorporates social 
norms and utility from feelings to explain why people tip, how workers respond to tips, and 
how the exact norm about tipping affects social welfare. The analysis shows that tipping 
increases welfare under several conditions; as such, tipping is an example that supports 
Arrow’s (1971) interpretation of social norms, “agreements to improve the efficiency of the 
economic system.”  
The customer and the waiter could benefit from a contract that prescribes the service 
quality and its price. While the restaurant can make a standard contract for all its employees 
and customers, however, the enforcement of the contract would be problematic: if the 
customer refuses to tip, the waiter will probably find it too costly to enforce the contract. The 
subjectivity of service quality makes enforcement even more difficult. Without tipping, the 
lack of an enforceable contract leads to minimal service quality, which is inefficient, because 
the customer’s utility from additional quality exceeds its cost to the waiter. The social norm 
of tipping remedies this potential market failure by providing an implicit standard contract. 
The embarrassment and unfairness that people feel when they violate the norm serve as an 
enforcement mechanism. As a result, the social norm of tipping can increase welfare by 
improving service quality. This suggests that economics and social norms share double-sided 
causality: economic reasons may create and support social norms, and social norms affect 
economic behavior.  
The welfare-enhancing role of tipping implies that the British customers in coffee shops 
who invented tipping in the 16
th century (Schein, Jablonski and Wohlfahrt 1984), as well as 
the Americans who brought the custom to the United States in the late 19
th century (Segrave 
1998) improved social welfare. It is not clear why in Europe, where tipping began, many 
establishments decided to replace tipping by service charges. The analysis suggests that doing 28   
so might be welfare reducing, and understanding why this happens is an interesting question 
for future research.  
The model suggests that although tipping can increase welfare, service quality and social 
welfare are likely to be below their optimal values. The exact shape of the social norm is 
crucial: higher sensitivity of the norm to service quality (i.e. the appropriate tip is a steep 
function of service quality) results in better service and higher social welfare. Low sensitivity 
of the norm to service quality may lead to zero quality in equilibrium. Surprisingly, if the 
norm dictates tips that are very low for poor service, this can also result in zero-quality 
equilibrium.  
While in Europe the replacement of tips with service charges takes away the advantages 
of tipping, in the United States the behavior of people may undermine the role of tips. Many 
people report feeling pressured to tip even for bad service. In a poll conducted at the website 
www.tipping.org, the question “Do you feel pressured to tip at a restaurant even if you feel 
you received bad service?” was posted. By April 13, 2003, out of 6069 voters, 66 percent 
answered “Yes.” Presumably, people feel pressured to tip for bad service because they are 
afraid to be viewed as “cheap” if they do not tip. In addition, they may feel uncomfortable 
stiffing the waiter whose income depends on tips. But if this pressure continues, tipping is 
likely to stop being welfare enhancing. If people tip similarly for bad and good service, 
waiters no longer have an incentive to provide excellent service. We should retain tipping as 
a mechanism of consumer monitoring by encouraging people to tip according to service 
quality. Bad service should be punished by a low tip (or no tip at all), and excellent service 
should be rewarded by more than 15 percent. Customers who refuse to tip when they receive 
bad service should be viewed not as “cheap” but rather as brave and as promoting welfare by 
disciplining the waiters. 29   
A common criticism against economic models that incorporate utility from conforming 
to social norms or from feelings is that every phenomenon can be easily explained if we 
allow the agent to care about things beyond his material well-being. While there is a lot of 
experimental evidence suggesting that people care about social norms, reciprocity, and other 
psychological motivations
11, many economists are still reluctant to accept the importance of 
psychological motivations and to incorporate those in economic models. One reason for this 
is that they question the external validity of these experiments: they argue that such behavior 
in experiments does not imply that in real-life economic situations we will observe the same 
behavior.  
Tipping is an excellent example for two things. First, tipping shows that such 
psychologically-motivated behavior happens in real-life situations involving dozens of 
billions of dollars, thus illustrating the external validity of these experiments. Second, tipping 
shows that insisting on models without social norms and feelings might yield false 
predictions about phenomena where norms and feelings play an important role. As Ben-Zion 
and Karni (1977) show, traditional economic analysis suggests that non-repeated customers 
should not tip. Yet, this prediction is obviously violated in practice, since most people tip 
even when they do not intend to return to the same establishment. This suggests that feelings 
and social norms are important not only in psychology and sociology, but also in economics. 
This lesson should be applied to other economic areas as well: models that incorporate 
feelings or social norms should not be discarded when they explain phenomena in which 
feelings or social norms are in fact important.  
Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1   
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The customer chooses t to maximize the following utility function: u(s, t, b) = –b(1 + t) + f(t 
– n(s)) + G(s, b), subject to the constraint t ≥ 0. Let us proceed by solving the unconstrained 
problem and examining whether the potentially optimal value of t is positive. For every value 
of s, the first-order condition with respect to t is –b + f’(t – n(s)) = 0. Notice that the value of 
t that solves the first-order condition is t^(s). The second-order sufficient condition is a strict 
concavity of f, which is satisfied by Assumption 1. If t^(s) ≥ 0 then the constraint t ≥ 0 is 
satisfied, and since the utility function is strictly concave in t, the unique global maximizer of 
u(s, t, b) is t = t^(s). If t^(s) < 0, then for all non-negative values of t, 0 = –b + f’(t^(s) – n(s)) 
> –b + f’(t – n(s)) = du/dt|t. The inequality follows from the strict concavity of f. Since du/dt 
is negative for all non-negative values of t, it is clear that the optimal value of t that satisfies 
the constraint t ≥ 0 is zero. Therefore, the optimal tip is the maximum between t^(s) and zero.   
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Corollary 1   
By the strict concavity of f, if b > f’(–n(s)) then t^(s) < 0. Using Proposition 1, this implies 
t*(s) = 0.   Q.E.D.    
Proof of Lemma 1   
Since f is strictly concave, f’ is strictly decreasing and therefore it has an inverse function, 
[f’]
–1. Using Definition 1, t^(s) – n(s) = [f’]
–1(b), a constant; that is, t^ and n are parallel 
functions.   Q.E.D.    
Proof of Corollary 2   
This follows directly from Lemma 1 and the assumption that n is non-decreasing and 
continuous.   Q.E.D.    
Proof of Proposition 2  31   
(i) If T1 = 0 then the first-order condition of the waiter’s utility with respect to s is –2E2s = 0, 
the second-order sufficient condition is satisfied (−2E2 < 0) and the optimal service quality is 
0.  
(ii) and (iii) When T1 > 0, the most convenient way to proceed is by dividing the analysis to 
two cases: T0 ≥ 0 and T0 < 0. 
Case 1: T0 ≥ 0. Notice that T1
2 ≥ –4T0E2, because E2 > 0, so we want to show that s = T1/2E2. 
Indeed, when T0 ≥ 0, max [T0 + T1s, 0] = T0 + T1s for all non-negative s. The first-order 
condition of the waiter’s maximization problem becomes T1 – 2E2s = 0 and the second-order 
sufficient condition is satisfied (−2E2 < 0), so the waiter chooses s = T1/2E2.  
Case 2: T0 < 0. Since T0 < 0, the tipping function has a kink. Recall that s0 = –T0/T1 > 0 is 
where the kink occurs. There are two sub-cases to consider:  
(a) If T1 ≤ e’(s0) = 2E2s0 = –2E2T0/T1, then s0 yields higher utility than any s > s0; the 
marginal cost of increasing s is 2E2s and it lies above the marginal benefit, T1, for s > s0, 
because T1 ≤ 2E2s0 and E2 > 0. Notice, however, that s = 0 is strictly preferred to s0: both 
yield a zero tip, but s = 0 entails strictly less effort. Rearranging the inequality we get that 
whenever T1
2 ≤ –2E2T0, the optimal service quality is zero. Notice that the last inequality can 
be satisfied only when T0 < 0; if T0 ≥ 0 then the right-hand side is non-positive, while T1
2 > 0. 
Therefore, we can say that whenever T1
2 ≤ –2E2T0, the optimal service quality is zero; we do 
not need to add the condition that T0 < 0 which we started from. 
(b) If T1 > e’(s0), or equivalently T1
2 > –2E2T0, then values of s that are close to s0 from the 
right are preferred to s0. For all s ≥ s0, we get v(b, s) = b(T0 + T1s – E0 – E2s
2), so if the waiter 
must choose s ≥ s0, his optimal s is obtained by the first-order condition: T1 – 2E2s = 0, or s = 
T1/2E2 (the second order sufficient condition is satisfied: −2E2 < 0). If the waiter must choose 
s ≤ s0, his optimal choice is s = 0, since it minimizes effort and the tip is zero for all s ≤ s0. 32   
We therefore have two candidates to be optimal in this case, and we have to compare the 
utility from them: v(b, 0) = –E0, and v(b, T1/2E2) = T0 + T1(T1/2E2) – E0 – E2(T1/2E2)
2 = T0 – 
E0 + T1
2/4E2. As a result, s = 0 is optimal in this case if and only if T0 + T1
2/4E2 < 0, or T1
2 < 
–4E2T0 (assume that when he is indifferent, the waiter chooses the higher service quality). 
Similarly to (a), this condition implies that T0 < 0 is satisfied. Combining this with the 
assumption we started from for this case, T1
2 > –2E2T0, we obtain that s = 0 whenever –4E2T0 
> T1
2 > –2E2T0. Add the result in (a), to get that s = 0 whenever T1
2 < –4E2T0, and s = T1/2E2 
whenever T1
2 ≥ –4E2T0.   Q.E.D.    
Proof of Corollary 3   
(i) By Proposition 2, when T0  ≥ 0 ,  s* = T1/2E2 = N1/2E2. Since E2 > 0,  s* is strictly 
increasing in N1. 
(ii) By Proposition 2, when T0 < 0, if T1
2 < –4E2T0 then s* = 0 and if T1
2 ≥ –4E2T0 > 0 then 
s* = T1/2E2 = N1/2E2. Substitute N1 = T1 in the inequalities and rearrange to find that X =  
(–4E2T0)
1/2 satisfies part (ii) of Corollary 3. 
(iii) If T0 ≥ 0, choose any N1 ≥ 2E2s. If T0 < 0, choose N1 ≥ max [2E2s, (–4E2T0)
1/2]. Notice 
that N0, F1, F2 and b, although they do not appear explicitly, affect the required level of N1 
through their effect on T0; F0 and E0 do not affect N1 in any way.   Q.E.D.    
Proof of Corollary 4   
By Proposition 2, whenever T0 < –T1
2/4E2, service quality is zero. Substitute T0 = N0 + (b – 
F1)/2F2 in the condition and rearrange to get N0 < –(b – F1)/2F2 –T1
2/4E2; that is, Y = –
T1
2/4E2 – (b – F1)/2F2 satisfies the condition in Corollary 4. Since N0 is assumed to be non-
negative, we should verify that Y > 0; this is the reason for the condition T1
2/4E2 < (F1 – 
b)/2F2.   Q.E.D.    
Proof of Lemma 2   33   
When the tip is strictly positive, the optimal tipping function is parallel to the social norm and 
therefore has a slope of N1 > 0. If service quality is zero and the tip is strictly positive, it 
implies that t(s) = T0 > 0. But then the waiter is better off choosing s slightly above zero 
rather than zero, since T1 > 0 = e’(0), so this cannot be an equilibrium.   Q.E.D.    
Proof of Proposition 3   
The first-order conditions of w(s, t, b) with respect to t and s are:  
( 12 )          ∂w/∂ t = f’(t – N0 – N1s) = 0, and        
( 13 )        ∂w/∂ s = –N1f’(t – N0 – N1s) + b(g’(s) – e’(s)) = 0.        
The second-order sufficient conditions for a maximum are: 
( 14 )          ∂
2w/∂ t
2 = f’’(t – N0 – N1s) < 0,        
( 15 )      ∂ 
2w/∂ s
2 = N1
2f’’(t – N0 – N1s) + b(g’’(s) – e’’(s)) < 0, and     




2) − (∂ 
2w/∂ t∂ s)
2 = f’’(t – N0 – N1s)(N1
2f’’(t – N0 – N1s) + b(g’’(s) 
– e’’(s))) − (N1f’’(t − N0 − N1s))
2 = bf’’(t – N0 – N1s)(g’’(s) – e’’(s)) > 0. 
The inequality in (14) holds since f is strictly concave. The inequalities in (15) and (16) hold 
because f is strictly concave and g − e is strictly concave by Assumption 3. 
Substituting (12) into (13) and assuming b > 0, we get g’(s) − e’(s) = 0. This equation defines 
the welfare-maximizing value of s; by the strict concavity of g − e, this value is unique, and 
using Assumption 2 and g’(s) > 0, such value exists. Substituting this value into (12) then 
gives the welfare-maximizing value of t. Assumption 1 ensures that this value of t exists and 
is unique. To proceed, let us define the following: 
(i) Let s
w be the unique value of s that solves the equation g’(s) − e’(s) = 0, and let t^
w be the 
unique value of t that solves the equation f’(t – N0 – N1s
w) = 0 (the superscript w stands for 
“welfare-maximizing”). Notice that t^
w might be negative. 
(ii) Let t
w ≡ max [t^
w, 0]. 
(iii) Let s* and t*(s*) be the service quality and tip in equilibrium.  34   
Since g’(s) > 0 for all s, e’(0) = 0 and e is strictly convex, we know that s
w > 0. If t^
w ≥ 0, 
then t^
w is the global maximizer of w and therefore it is also the global maximizer subject to 
the constraint t ≥ 0. When t^
w < 0, then since t enters w only through f and f is strictly 
concave, the welfare-maximizing value of t subject to t ≥ 0 is 0. Therefore, t
w is value of t that 
maximizes welfare subject to t ≥ 0. 
If s* = 0, then by Lemma 2 we get t*(s*) = 0, implying that s
w > s* and t
w ≥ t*(s*), and 
Proposition 3 holds. For the rest of the proof, assume that s* > 0. This implies t*(s*) > 0, 
because if the tip in equilibrium is zero, the waiter cannot find it optimal to provide strictly 
positive service quality. The tipping function has a slope N1 for all s > s0 (recall that s0 is the 
kink point of the tipping function; it may be negative, and then the tipping function is affine 
for all s ∈ [0, ∞), which is the range of interest). Since t*(s*) > 0, we know that s* > s0 and 
the slope of the tipping function at s* is N1 > 0. The first-order condition of the waiter’s 
problem implies that whenever s* > 0, e’(s*) = N1. Since e’(s
w) = g’(s
w) > N1 = e’(s*), it 
follows by strict convexity of e that s
w > s*. This completes part (i) of Proposition 3.  
Because t*(s*) > 0, the first-order condition of the customer’s problem has to be satisfied: 
f’(t*(s*) − N0 − N1s*) = b (this condition might be violated only in the corner solution, t*(s*) 
= 0). The strict concavity of f implies that the value of t that satisfies f’(t − N0 − N1s
w) = b 
must satisfy: 
( 17 )        t − N0 − N1s
w = t*(s*) − N0 − N1s*.      
     It follows that t = t*(s*) + N1(s
w − s*) > t*(s*) > 0. Strict concavity of f implies that 
t^
w > t > t*(s*) for all b > 0. This completes the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 3.   Q.E.D.   
Proof of Corollary 5   
(i) The proof of Proposition 3 shows that if s* > 0, then e’(s
w) = g’(s
w) and e’(s*) = N1. Since 
e’ is strictly increasing, s* is strictly increasing in N1. Because s
w is the unique solution to 35   
g’(s
w) − e’(s
w) = 0 and g and e do not depend on N1, s
w is not a function of N1. Since s
w > s*, 
it follows that |s
w – s*| = s
w – s* is strictly decreasing in N1. 
(ii) The optimal social norm is the one that induces the equilibrium with the highest welfare. 
Since service quality and tip in equilibrium are lower than their optimal values, it is clear that 
a norm that results in s* = 0 (which implies t*(s*) = 0) is not optimal. The first-order 
condition of the customer’s problem is f’(t^(s) − N0 − N1s) = b, where t^(s) might be negative. 
Since f is strictly concave, this implies that t^(s) − N0 − N1s = [f’]
−1(b), where [f’]
−1 denotes 
the inverse function of f’. For all N0 > −[f’]
−1(b) and all s ≥ 0 we get t^(s) = [f’]
−1(b) + N0 + 
N1s ≥ [f’]
−1(b) + N0 > 0. Therefore, if N0 > −[f’]
−1(b), tips are always positive; according to 
Lemma 2, this implies s* > 0. In the rest of the proof I therefore limit attention to s* > 0.  
Recall from (11) that w(s, t, b) = f(t − N0 − N1s) + b(g(s) – e(s)). Whenever t > 0, t − N0 − N1s 
= [f’]
−1(b), a constant. Therefore, conditional on the tip being strictly positive, the norm 
cannot affect f(t − N0 − N1s). The optimal norm is the one that maximizes b(g(s) − e(s)). Since 
b is exogenous and g − e is strictly concave, the best a norm can do is to induce s* that 
satisfies the first-order condition g’(s*) − e’(s*) = 0. By definition, the unique s* that satisfies 
this equation is s
w. Since e’(s*) = N1 in equilibrium, if N1 = g’(s
w) then s* = s
w; to see this, 
notice that in this case we have e’(s
w) = g’(s
w) = N1 = e’(s*). Strict convexity of e then 
implies s
w = s*. That is, the optimal affine norm has N1 = g’(s
w). Notice that since we can do 
no better than implement s
w, N 0 has no effect on social welfare once it is high enough to 
ensure that s* > 0.  
(iii) Since g − e is strictly concave and is maximized at s
w, g(s) − e(s) is strictly increasing in s 
for all s < s
w. The norm affects social welfare only through g(s) − e(s). In addition, for all N1 
< g’(s
w), s* is strictly increasing in N1 and s* < s
w. It follows that social welfare is strictly 
increasing in N1 for all N1 < g’(s
w).   Q.E.D.    36   
Proof of Proposition 4   
In the absence of tipping, the waiter minimizes his effort by choosing to provide zero service 
quality. Since W(s, b) is strictly concave and is maximized at s
w > s*, it is higher for s* > 0 
than for s = 0.   Q.E.D. 37   
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